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Humanity and ideas, as well as things, are facts, and a jurisprudence
which takes them into account cannot perish from the earth.
-

Charles A. Beard1

[What is merit in an author is often a defect in a statesman, and characteristics which improve a book may be fatal to a revolution.
-

I.

Alexis de Tocqueville2

INTRODUCTION

Calculating the proportion of administrative law scholarship that
sets for itself the goal of rethinking, reconstructing, refocusing, or otherwise dramatically reconsidering the field would be an interesting task. I
suspect the proportion of such work is higher in administrative law than
in most other subjects, perhaps because so many of those in the field find
the conceptual foundations of administrative law, and the results of so
3
much judicial and scholarly labor, unsatisfying.
In addressing the administrative problems of today, I seek to challenge the doctrinal separation that has evolved between (1) politics and
the partisan struggle over political ideology and public policy, and (2) the
realm of legal theory, the source of most prescriptions for the reform of
legal doctrines and institutions. Part of this challenge entails sketching
* Professor, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Cynthia Farina, Cass Sunstein, Judge
Patricia Wald, Marshall Breger, Neil Gorsuch, Jacquelyn Jones, Marta Wagner, and Roberto Unger
for their insightful comments and ideas.
1. Beard, Introduction: A Background, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS vii (A. Lief ed. 1930).
2. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION, Book II, ch. XIII, at

180 (J. Bonner trans. 1856).
3. I confess that this Article is in that vein of perhaps overweening ambition.
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my argument, detailed elsewhere, 4 that administrative law fails on its
own terms to discipline the arbitrariness of bureaucrats and judges. Administrative law fails, in part, because of a deeply fundamental and conceptually flawed reliance on separation of powers anachronisms.
Furthermore, I argue that the preoccupation with controlling discretion
is the wrong conception of administrative law for today, and that an alternative project more suited to our moment would focus on the elaboration and application of principles of sound governance, rather than
attempting to sustain the pre-New Deal hostility to the affirmative regulatory state.
In addition to challenging the separation between politics and legal
theory, I also undertake two broader intellectual enterprises. First, in the
sphere of theory, I want to suggest some elements of a compelling postpluralist theory of public law, relying in part on a reconstruction of civic
republicanism. 5 Second, in the sphere of politics, I seek to begin an extra-legal effort to define a post-Reagan political ideology-an exercise
that has much to do with partisan politics, but even more to do with
governance and progress.6 Perhaps most importantly, I will try to explain why politics, theory, and practical invention must be linked if they
are to be successful. All three tasks concern lawyers, judges, and scholars, whether they recognize it or not. There should be little argument
that the content of law is "deeply and thoroughly political,"' 7 even if
these realms are distinguishable in the abstract. My concern is with the
purposes and ideological requirements of useful theorizing about law.
Administrative law, properly understood, is of paramount importance. Its enterprise bears considerable credit or blame for the very
structure, operation, and even the ultimate efficacy of governance. The
success of government cannot be wholly dependent on able administrators because they may or may not be present. Nor can we depend on the
romantic image of concerned voters regularly disciplining the political
branches because political participation is anemic 8 and awareness of pub4. See C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990).
5. More generally, I consider the potential contribution of post-modem sensibilities.
6. See C. LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 41-44 (1991)
(characterizing progress in alternative ways, including increasing control over social dysfunction).
7. R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985).

For an interesting but ultimately

unpersuasive effort to characterize the essential formality of law and thereby distinguish it from
politics, see Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949

(1988).
8. See Berke, Experts Say Low 1988 Turnout May Be Repeated, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1988,
§ 1, at 32, col. 2 ("Only half the Americans who were eligible to vote in the Presidential election this
week did vote."); Shenon, The 1990 Elections; Voter Turnout Still Poor, With 3 Exceptions, N.Y.
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lic affairs pitiful. 9 In short, for the very reasons that the Framers and the
intellectuals who influenced them turned to structural safeguards to promote their normative vision of sound governance, and for the very reasons that Legal Realists, steeped in decades of Progressive social
criticism, appreciated the need for the structural innovations of the administrative state, so too should we appreciate that the processes and

institutions of public law must be central to the renewal of governance in
our time. In short, effective legal institutions and processes are a neces-

sary, though not sufficient, mechanism for ensuring sound governance.
Today, America is in the throes of a dimly appreciated crisis in governance. The administrative state is diseased: The evidence stretches
from budget deficits to homelessness; from bank failures to crack babies;
from the failures of public schooling to greenhouse gasses; from persis-

tent racial inequalities to languishing economic growth. 10 Thoughtful
observers increasingly question the health of American democratic capiTimes, Nov. 11, 1990, § 1, at 27, col. 1 ("[F]ewer than four in 10 people eligible to vote actually did
in this year's midterm election.").
9. See Lamar,Fight to the Finish, TIME, Nov. 3, 1986, at 18 ("[P]olitical analysts have found
that the American electorate has become anesthetized by ignorance and apathy.").
10. This sharp assessment of governance is at odds with the self-congratulatory air in Congress
following the impressive, substantive debate concerning the use of military force in the Gulf on
January 10-12, 1991. See 137 CONG. Rac. S97 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991) (Senate debate and presentation of two resolutions scheduled to take place from Jan. 10 to Jan. 12) (House debate and presentation of resolutions from Jan. 10-12 following general discussion on Jan. 7 and Jan. 9). For all the
great significance of those deliberations, it is worth observing that a constitutional crisis was only
narrowly averted. A switch of only three votes in the Senate would have put President Bush to the
test: Would he order an attack in the face of Congressional rejection of an authorizing resolution,
and in the face of overwhelming bipartisan votes asserting that such an attack was unlawful without
congressional authorization? See 137 CONG. Rnc. 5403 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (S.J. Res. 2 passed
by a vote of 52-47); H.R. Con. Res. 32, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. H390, H485 (daily
ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (H.J. Res. 77 passed 250-183, 2 not voting). Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (executive power at lowest ebb when
President tries to act contrary to Congress). Another troubling feature of the debate was that the
crucial decisions to deploy 430,000 troops and adopt a threatening offensive military posture were
made without congressional approval or, it seems, meaningful consultation. See Lewis, Abroad at
Home; PresidentialPower, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17, col. 1 (editorial) (Bush took action
deploying troops "entirely on his own, without consulting Congress, much less asking its approval").
During the Senate debate, Senator Mitchell noted that the President had changed American policy
overnight by doubling the troops in the Persian Gulf on November 8 without consultation or public
debate. See 137 CONG. REc. S100, Sl01 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991); id. at S104-05 (statement of Sen.
Leahy regarding unilateral change of policy). This was brilliant political gamesmanship by the President, at least in the short run, but it hardly embodies an admirable model of deliberation by our
representatives. Mr. Bush observed, reluctantly, the role of Congress as a check-an approach that
treated members of Congress as objects to be manipulated rather than as full constitutional partners
in a critical national security decision. See Confrontation in the Gulf-Bush's Letter to Congressional
Leaders, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1991, at A6, col. 4 (Bush asking Congress to "adopt a Resolution
stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means" to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait).
On balance, this hardly represented a fine moment in governance.
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talism, even as our Western model of political economy seems to have
decisively vanquished its communist and totalitarian counterparts.
My consideration of how public law has contributed to the crisis in
democratic governance, and how it can be turned to good use in addressing the crisis, focuses on the role of what we might imperialistically consider administrative law. I approach this in four stages. First, Part II
summarizes my view of the governance crisis and (without claim of originality) of the conventional project, or ambition, of administrative law.
Second, Part III characterizes the modus operandi and the failings of
administrative law. Third, Part IV considers the relationship between
the task of redefining the project of administrative law and the related
intellectual projects of political ideology, legal theory and practical invention. Finally, Part V sketches an alternative project of administrative
law that points directly toward the pursuit of sound governance.
II. THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PROJECT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A.

The Crisis in Governance and Democracy

Today, we fear recession, not depression; Gulf wars, not World
War; an ennui of democratic spirit, not a triumph of brown-shirted fascists. In what sense do our contemporary concerns amount to a crisis or
a diseased administrative state?
A partial list of broadly acknowledged difficulties may include:
* Governmental activity is often slothful, wasteful, and even misguided. 11
* Critical public problems-ranging from public education to bank mismanagement to Third World debt to violent crime-seem12to fester for
years and years at enormous human and economic cost.
*

The economy languishes with dozen-digit deficits, low net savings and
growth, declining prosperity relative to other nations, and a widening
13
gap between the wealthy and those mired in persistent poverty.

See, eg., Schneider, Military Has New Strategic Goal In Cleanup of Vast Toxic Waste, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 5, 1991, at Al, col. 4 (describing military cleanup plan that "could well result in one of
history's costliest failures").
12. See Daniels, Education;IlliteracySeen as Threat to U.S. Economic Edge, N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1988, at B8, col. 3; Stevenson, Savings Industry'sNew Curbs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at DI,col.
3; Third World Debt Strategy, 1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance and
Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,Housing and UrbanAffairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); FB.L Report ConfirmsSharp Rise in Violent Crime, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at A10,col.
4.
13. See Greenhouse, Report Criticalof Drop in Savings, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1991, at D2, col.
4; Rosenbaum, Washington Talk- Deficit Up, But in '91 The FurorHas Passed, N.Y. Times, July 14,
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The country is becoming more unequal,
with fault lines of color and
14
class threatening to become chasms.
Disaffection with the electoral process seems to be steadily increasing,
as voter turnout steadily drops 15 and political campaigns become
increasingly expensive aiid empty.16
There is a deepening perceptual gap between those who think all is
well in the commonwealth and that opportunity abounds, and those
17
who feel dispirited and, perhaps, angry with government.
With little difficulty, one could double the length of this list. The

effort to identify causes, however, is more challenging. At a superficial
level one might offer the following:
*
Administrative agencies (and corporate bureaucracies alike) are
unwieldy, complex, and institutionally unimaginative.
•
Congress is not an efficient organization to address complex or difficult
policy questions.
*
Divided partisan government makes consensus on hard problems especially difficult.
The nature of the institutional presidency, and its media advantages,
make the dynamics of presidential politics quite separate from the
dynamics of congressional elections, creating a schism in electoral
mandates.
*

The news media do a poor job of promoting public understanding of
important problems, or facilitating wise voter choices.
At a somewhat deeper level, a partial list of causes might include:
* Excessive present-mindedness: We have developed a gourmand's
appetite for the largess of an active welfare state, but we are not willing
to tax ourselves to pay the bills; we prefer instead to tax future generations by bequeathing them enormous debts.
* The dominance of the media over democratic processes: Elected representatives and senior appointed officials can survive the accountability
of the polls and achieve the Framers' ideal of wisdom only if the electorate can somehow be made to understand their difficult decisions,
which in turn requires effective news media and policy processes open
to public observation.
" Congressional stagnation: Congress's effectiveness in setting an agenda
and forging policy has declined because political parties are in decline;
political money is on the rise.
1991, § 1, at 10, col. 1; Silk, Economic Scene; Who is No. 1? It's Hard to Say, N.Y. Times, July 27,
1990, at D2, col. 1; Study Finds Wage Erosion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1990, at D7, col. 2.
14. See America's Blacks: A World Apart, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 17-21.
15. See Berke, supra note 8; Shenon, supra note 8.
16. See Berke, Campaign Finance; In Election Spending, Watch Ceiling and Use a Loophole,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
17. See Williams, A New Racial Poll, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1979, at 48.
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Bureaucratic unreponsiveness: The natural traits of bureaucracy
include inertia and rigidity, which tend to incline them against progress.
And so on. By repeatedly asking "Why?" one can generate successive lists of increasingly fundamental hypotheses about governance and
its failures. Before long, one reaches propositions drawn from political
philosophy, anthropology, or theology.18 However, the efficacy of public
institutions is bound to figure prominently in any analysis of government
failure. Yet, sound governance does not appear to be the focus of administrative law.
B.

The Project of Administrative Law

From a contemporary perspective, the unsatisfactory performance
of administrative law is directly related to the focus of administrative law
doctrines: the control of executive discretion through the imposition of
procedural fairness requirements; substantive rationality; and fidelity to
sources of positive law, especially congressional commands. These concerns proceed from the premise, familiar in liberal legal ideology, that
discretion in the state is dangerous. The consequent threat to personal
liberty and the general welfare must be contained through public law,
including administrative law.
Administrative law's antidiscretion project, rooted in our federal
constitution of limited powers, assumes that it is generally better to err
on the side of restraining and checking government action, even at some
risk to democratically adopted, bureaucratically refined programmatic
goals. State action is viewed as the exception to a natural condition of
autonomy, free markets, and private orderings. The exceptional instances of state intervention must be closely policed to preserve the integrity of the market, individual rights, and the realm of private affairs. An
expansion of state action is made safe for liberty and palatable to democracy only when constraints are imposed on administrative discretion
through judge-made law and congressionally enacted procedural safeguards. Virtually every corner of administrative law embodies this modus vivendi: discretion, yes, but only with safeguards. Throughout the
enterprise of administrative law, judicial review has been essential.
In pursuing the antidiscretion project, judges employ doctrines intended to confine that discretion, but the doctrines themselves seem to
transfer much discretion from unelected bureaucrats to unelected judges.
18. How far one goes in this chain of "whys" is perhaps a matter of intellectual taste and
purpose. See, eg., Reid, TraditionalMorality at Core of Robertson's Political Quest, Wash. Post,
Mar. 2, 1988, at A8, col. 1 (discussing presidential candidate Pat Robertson's characterization of the
problems of American government in moral and religious terms).
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We must evaluate our legal regime not only by whether bureaucratic discretion is checked, but also by whether we have done so without simply
relocating and disguising that discretion-hiding it, as it were, beneath
black robes and in dusty volumes unintelligible to the lay public and
media.
As to each of these observations, some problems arise. The premise
disfavoring state action and privileging private orderings is troublesome
not only because it assumes some natural order of private relations antecedent to the state, but also because it shackles the collective action of
government, taxing modem ambitions. The Lochner era of substantive
due process had to yield to the modem collective pursuit of the general
welfare. Like the New Deal Realists, we want a vigorous administrative
state, capable of difficult and bold actions, not enfeebled by eighteenthcentury habits of civic thought. Administrative discretion, after all, is
essential to bold action, so discretion cannot be the focus of concern if
administrative law is to serve rather than hinder our ambitions. The
irony is that the promise that administrative law would constrain discretion helped make the New Deal evolution of government possible in view
of the eighteenth-century sensibilities, deeply felt in segments of the legislatures and judiciary.
Expressed in a developmental metaphor, we had an immature administrative state, which was to be disciplined by constraints on discretion, and kept healthy by doses of proceduralism, like so much cod liver
oil. Somehow, as the immature enterprise grew to today's ambitious, adolescent welfare state, this legal regime has undergone too little evolution. My claim is not that administrative law of the past three decades
has stunted the legitimate growth of government-it has not. But public
law has done too little to stave off the aches and traumas of our adolescence. The crisis of our childhood was fear of unconstrained discretion,
and public law responded; but today's crisis is wasteful, foolish, indifferent and ineffectual government. These aches and pains of ineffectual governance largely escape the attention of administrative law doctrine, and
hence of judicial review. In a fundamental sense we are blinded to the
current crisis by the continuing obsession with the discretion accompanying the commingling of powers, and by the related article of faith providing that the political branches, rather than the courts, are the proper
bodies to address misfeasance and nonfeasance.
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THE MODUS OPERANDI AND THE FAILINGS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The Trichotomy of DecisionmakingParadigms,and Two
Conceptual Failings

Consider a trichotomy of paradigmatic decisionmaking methods,
derived from the separation of powers ethos of public law, and representing different forms of reasoning that we might expect to be used by those
who wield the state's power: adjudicatoryfairness, science, and politics.
They are rooted respectively in the crude images of the judge, the faceless
technocratic expert, and the politician. These paradigms and their interrelationships provide the framework for much judicial analysis of where
the mood for review of an administrative action should be located along a
spectrum that ranges from extreme deference to aggressive interventionism. This framework, however, has conceptual failings that, in turn,
cause administrative law doctrine to fail at its antidiscretion project. I
hope to provide an account of how the arguments in administrative law
controversies are formed, what makes so many propositions debatable,
and what makes reasonable observers doubt whether such vital fields as
the scope of review doctrine have any underlying rational consistency.
What is the content of this trichotomy of decisionmaking methods?
The adjudicatoryfairness paradigm is not just about courts because the
key elements are also familiar in other settings: reasoned elaboration,
neutrality of the decisionmaker, well-elaborated notions of hearing and
confrontation, and consistency over time and across like situations. This
last element includes the discovery of any preexisting rules (whether statutory, constitutional, or common law) thought to control a particular
dispute. Appellate court decisionmaking is close to the prototype of the
adjudicatory fairness doctrine. A bench trial is also close, although the
fact-finding process, as distinguished from the law-applying process, partially implicates the second paradigm, that of expertise.
By science, I mean the familiar images of a scientist bent over laboratory bench, an accountant dissecting a balance sheet, or a mechanic
servicing a helicopter. Key elements are rationality, objectivity, deductive reasoning, and specialized knowledge. I associate the scientific
method with managerial efficiency here, in order to contrast them with
the procedural values of broad participation and public disclosure (which
are characteristic of the other paradigms). Facts and investigation are
often critical. The decisionmaker is depersonalized; although we learn
and remember the author of an important court opinion and perhaps
even the principal sponsors of noteworthy legislation, we rarely note or
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even remember the author of a regulation, however important or
controversial.
Finally, the politics paradigm encompasses interest accommodation
or balancing. At one extreme, the individual decisionmaker undervalues
minority interests and straightforwardly applies his or her personal values and partisan preferences. At the other extreme, in a collective or
institutional setting, the politics paradigm appears to be pluralism, democracy, or electoral competition at work. As practiced by an individual, the same paradigm can operate as the dispensing of favors, logrolling, or allegiance to constituents' interests. 19 Discretionary or policy
choices implicate this politics paradigm because the highly subjective social values and the balancing of various interest-group concerns distinguish these actions from instances of science-like expertness or
adjudicatory fairness. 20
How are these three paradigms implicit in doctrine? To the extent
that a hypothetical judge understands a decisional problem to be one that
calls for application of the adjudicatory fairness paradigm familiar to
courts, the judge will be more likely to intervene, either to insist that the
agency apply the appropriate paradigm, or to correct its misapplication.
An example of mismatch would arise if an agency relies on the expertise
paradigm when the problem called for the fairness methods of an adjudicatory hearing. An example of flawed application would be when the
agency correctly selects, say, the adjudicatory fairness paradigm, but
then mistakenly fails to supply a neutral decisionmaker or an oral
hearing.
Many areas of doctrine-from scope of review to official notice, and
from the rulemaking-adjudication distinction to problems of official
bias-can be analyzed in terms of the trichotomy. By using the trichotomy as a diagnostic test, one can account for the critical considerations
that are overtly employed by courts and advocates in these disparate areas of doctrine. An analysis of the paradigms, their interrelationships,
and the crude separation of powers-based presumptive assignment of paradigms to branches of government breaks action down into discrete parts
capable of close inspection. The trichotomy, and its manipulation, can
provide an underlying explanation for why doctrine contains the tests
and categories it does, and why doctrinal analysis is often unsatisfying or
inconclusive.
19. See, e.g., W. RIORDAN, PLUNrKETr OF TAMMANY HALL (1963) (classic work on patronage
and the political mechanism).
20. See C. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 74-83.
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Doctrinal analysis, however, is not mechanical. If it were, administrative law would be a simple science, rather than the haze of competing
considerations that we see played out in briefs and judicial opinions. The
heart of my argument, therefore, is an explanation of how the structure
of the trichotomy and the process of employing the paradigms of science,
fairness, and politics in calibrating judicial deference obfuscate clear decisional principles.
Before I provide examples, I will refine this primitive sketch of the
trichotomy by introducing the two most important mechanisms by
which the deep reliance of the trichotomy generates uncertainty and argument in administrative law. I term these "conceptual" failings to underscore their logical inevitably.
The first conceptual failing is the notion of attributive or normative
duality. Each decisionmaking paradigm has associated with it a collection of positive and negative attributes, or normative associations-a
kind of Jekyll-and-Hyde dualism that, in a given situation, may make it
debatable as to which paradigm applies. The duality also confuses
whether in an agency decision the presence of a given paradigm is reason
to be comforted and deferential, or concerned and interventionist.
For example, in many judicial opinions and commentaries, the adjudicatory fairness paradigm is praised for its neutrality, concern for consistency, and attention to reasoned elaboration. However, this is
accompanied by a set of companion vices: the method tends to be expensive, removed from political accountability, proceduralistic, stylistic, arcane, conservative, and past-focused. The science paradigm is, on the
positive side, objective, rational, verifiable, and efficient. On the negative
side, however, science is impersonal, alienating, mechanical, and inaccessible to the lay public. Finally, the politics paradigm promises participation, democracy, responsiveness, and accountability. Yet it carries with
it the negative attributes of subjectivity, willfulness, majority tyranny,
and even irrationality. These dualitiespermit advocates orjudges, in particular cases, to emphasize selectively one side or the other to support a
particularclaim about the appropriatedegree ofjudicial deference. Thus,
a brief or opinion will invite judicial intervention against the political
paradigm by reciting the negative attributes of arbitrariness and tyranny,
whereas the opposing side will suggest deference by reciting the virtues of
democracy and accountability. The observer is often left confused and
wondering what principle causes one side of the duality to prevail.
The second major conceptual failing of the trichotomy is the boundaryproblem. Although the decisionmaking paradigms are arguably distinct in the abstract, in practice they are commingled and inseparable
except when subjected to artificial and distorted conceptual violence,
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which often occurs. The commingling is most clear with controversial or
difficult agency decisions. Where one paradigm ends and another begins
is a matter of arbitrary perceptions or skillful advocacy. Indeed, this
confusion of boundaries is often so serious that, when we observe agency
actions or statements, our description is nothing but a choice among paradigms, which in turn amounts to a choice about scope of review or judicial deference.
For example, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgates a health standard that protects workers
against benzene exposures greater than one part per million, that decision is an amalgam of fact, policy, and law that reflects the commingled
use of scientific, political, and fairness paradigms. Whether and how to
extrapolate from imperfect epidemiological information is not, in truth,
the province of any single paradigm. (Whether there is "enough" evidence of carcinogenicity is a question of biomedical science, political attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, and adjudicatory construction of the
statute.) Focusing on just one of the three fundamental hues in the complex picture may simplify the decision about scope of judicial review, but
it requires an unreal understanding of the benzene problem and of
21
OSHA's task.
B. How the Trichotomy Shapes Doctrine and DoctrinalArgument
In my other work I provide numerous examples of how areas of
doctrinal argument in administrative law are shaped by attempts to employ the distinctions and associations of this trichotomy of fairness, science, and politics. 2 2 Because courts do not use these categories explicitly,
the burden of my argument is to demonstrate that the paradigms and
modes of analysis that I suggest are a reasonably accurate and useful
explanation for the patterns of behavior we observe. Consider the following two examples.
1. ProceduralChoice andDesign. The basic logic of the rulemaking-adjudication distinction is that when the adjudicatory fairness paradigm is appropriate, the analysis will militate toward individualized
administrative adjudication, whereas the science or politics paradigm is
better suited to rulemaking. The context may be an analysis of procedural due process, interpretation of ambiguous procedural commands in
a statute, or the actual discretionary decision by the legislature or agency
when designing a procedure. In the familiar teaching cases, such as
21. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(The Benzene Case).
22. See C. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 13-130.
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Londoner v. City ofDenver,23 Bi-MetallicInvestment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization,24 United States v. FloridaEast Coast Railway,25 Goldbergv.
Kelly, 26 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,27 and NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 28 the opinions struggle with the question of whether quasi-legislative
rulemaking or quasi-judicial adjudication is the appropriate procedure
for a given problem before the administrative agency.
The judges invoke the attributes or norms to which I referred
above, 29 and reliably emphasize the positive attributes of the winning
paradigm and the negative attributes of the losing paradigm. More specifically, if we analyze the list of particular circumstances material to the
choice between rulemaking and decisionmaking-as offered in the cases,
or in commentary such as the seminal articles by Judge Friendly 30 and
Professor Shapiro3 1-we find that these circumstances are themselves derived from the distinctions of the trichotomy. Thus, in Bi-Metallic, Justice Holmes upholds the denial of hearings by focusing on the large
number of property taxpayers affected by the general revaluation:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption....
Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by
their power, immediate or remote, over those who
32
make the rule.
By contrast, the Court in Londoner required some opportunity for individualized hearing before the city fixed the amount of property assessments for street improvements. 33 In FloridaEast Coast Railway, Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion upheld the use of informal trial-type
rulemaking in a difficult problem of statutory interpretation by emphasizing the negative associations with adjudicatory formality, and comparing these with the positive attributes of expert and political
34
decisionmaking incorporated in quasi-legislative agency procedures.
2. Scope of Review. As important as procedural requirements are
to contemporary administrative law, even more central is the problem of
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

210 U.S. 373 (1908).
239 U.S. 441 (1915).
410 U.S. 224 (1973).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
416 U.S. 267 (1974).
394 U.S. 759 (1969).
See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1268 (1975).

31. Shapiro,
Policy, 78 HARV.
32. 239 U.s.
33. 210 U.S.
34. 410 U.S.

The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
L. REV.921 (1965).
at 445.
at 385-86.
at 235.

Vol. 1991:561]

THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS

determining the scope of judicial review, or degree of deference, for
agency determinations of fact, law, and policy (or discretionary law-application). Again, the trichotomy provides a helpful way to understand
why the doctrinal categories are what they are, and how arguments on
either side of a proposition can be constructed.
Consider, for example, the infamous Chevron case.35 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had, consistent with the Reagan Administration's antiregulatory fihad, decided to permit economically
efficient pollution tradeoffs among point sources within an imaginary
"bubble" at an industrial source, rejecting a more natural statutory interpretation that seemed to require that every individual source meet pollution control standards. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reviewed the bubble concept with an independent
scope of review, treating it as a question of law calling for the court's
traditional decisionmaking methods of statutory construction and stare
decisis.3 6 The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's reasoning,
holding that the statute did not speak to the definitional question at
hand, 37 and effectively treated the dispute not as a matter of law (appropriate for adjudicatory methods familiar to courts) but instead as a matter of policy appropriate for the balancing judgments of the executive
branch-the branch ostensibly vested with the authority and expertise to
make such choices. Neither court focused on the quality of the scientific
or economic evidence supporting the agency's claim that the bubble
strategy would serve the statutory purposes, however defined. However,
such a "hard-look" approach emphasizing facts, rather than law or policy, was logically available. And perhaps it would have been more helpful, regardless of what residuum of discretion rests with the agency. On
its own terms, Chevron is about the law-politics distinction, with the
Supreme Court attempting to narrow the range of matters that may be
placed in the classic "independent" scope of review box traditionally labeled "law." The Court's two-step treatment of statutory language and
history is an effort to define what "law" is by reference to what judges
can (properly) know, in comparison with things that administrators will
know.
Thus, the key doctrinal categories of law, fact, and policy are conceptually grounded on the paradigms of adjudicatory fairness, science,
and politics. Yet, the interesting point for my purposes is that because
the paradigms are so difficult to disentangle, doctrinal categories will be
separable only at the price of severe distortion and logic-chopping. At35. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
36. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-60.
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tributive duality compounds the problem of drawing boundaries between
the paradigms. Thus, the Chevron majority could emphasize the virtues
of deference to politics and expertise; those opposed could emphasize the
dangers of political arbitrariness or the importance of judicial review to
ensure that the expertise paradigm is applied correctly in light of
whatever standards of science and policy rationality can be discovered
with the aid of communities of opinion outside the agency. The problematic boundary between the paradigms makes the approaches of either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in Chevron seem perfectly reasonable. Perhaps more importantly, the boundary problem also helps us
understand why and how lower courts and the Supreme Court itself have
responded to Chevron with ambivalence and inconsistency. Because any
given problem can be placed under the rubric of more than one paradigm, the selection of a particular paradigm as controlling reflects a subjective judgment call.
C.

The Implications of the Trichotomy's Failingsfor Scholarship

It is not remarkable that one can trace many elements of administrative law doctrine to the trichotomy, and thence to the separation of powers. After all, structural elements of public law should be rooted in the
most fundamental structural premises of our constitutional system. A
far more interesting observation relates to how this analysis accounts for
the observable problems of doctrine in practice. Chief among these
problems, as we have seen, are the broad judicial discretion to fashion an
ad hoc scope of review for the problem at hand, and the bluntness and
indirectness of law as an instrument to assure us that administrative decisions will be substantively sound.
But there is more. Scholarship in administrative law overwhelmingly reflects the same deeply pervasive influence of separation of powers
concerns and, implicitly, the trichotomy. Predictably, then, the various
scholarly prescriptions for doctrinal reform or rationalization fall prey to
the conceptual difficulties that I have outlined-attributive duality and
the boundary problem.
The most obvious and common error, in my view, is the scholarship
that accepts, unquestioningly, the canonical assignment of institutional
rules: courts focus on questions of law, while the agency represents expertise and, within some vague bounds, political discretion. Outside
questions of law, the court's role must be limited because the judges are
neither elected nor expert. Scholarship attempting to divine clear doctrinal guidance from these separation of powers nostrums will, like similarly reasoned judicial opinions, fail to persuade because the boundary
problems of the trichotomy require that in interesting cases we will be

Vol. 1991:561]

THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS

unable to disentangle convincingly the three paradigms. Moreover, the
normative arguments that may be rehearsed to reinforce the separated
institutional roles, such as the virtue of representative government, or of
an independent judiciary, can readily be countered as a result of the at38
tributive duality mentioned above.
No writer in the field has been more important to my own thinking
than Professor Louis Jaffe. His close analysis of doctrine, however, does
not escape these difficulties. In his analysis of scope of review, for example, Professor Jaffe wisely suggests that we recognize the shared responsibility of courts and agencies in finding law,3 9 yet we are left unable to
separate law-making from fact-finding reliably because the boundary
problems are inescapable. 4°
Similarly, in Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's description of the
rulemaking-adjudication distinction, we see a list of factors that distinguish quasi-legislative and adjudicative facts, such as the number of individuals affected or the nature of the arguments to be developed at a
hearing. 4 1 The list of considerations, however, can be comfortably linked
to the trichotomy. It is because of the conceptual flaws of the trichotomy
that the analysis Davis recommends leaves many choices about agency
procedures to arbitrary judgment.
More broadly, to the extent that any theory of administrative law,
or any elaboration of a doctrinal problem, proceeds from a traditional
assumption about the judicial role, it will suffer from the difficulty that
modem administration confounds the traditional assignment of roles and
decisionmaking paradigms. Nowhere is this clearer than in the quagmire
of statutory interpretation. One can accept the Supreme Court's problematic point in the Chevron case that congressional silence implies a
grant of discretion to the agency. 42 But no court or commentator has
provided any useful guidelines to tell us when Congress has fairly implied
some statutory standards versus when it has simply granted discretion.
Nor can there be any such doctrinal guidelines, because any attempt to
discern definitely the boundary between general and particular in what
Congress has addressed will implicitly require a vision of appropriate institutional roles. This leads back, once again, to distinctions rooted in
the trichotomy, and the conceptual failings of the trichotomy.
38. See supra text accompanying note 21.
39. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 25-27 (1965).

40. See C. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 133-68.
41. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12:3-12:4, at 412-20 (2d ed. 1978);
see also Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924, 954 n.128 (1965).
42. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
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Recognizing the Trichotomy: MarginalReform Through
Disclosure

Administrative law doctrine is extraordinarily squeamish when it
comes to the role of partisan ideology or political preferences in agency
decisionmaking. We know, for example, that a strong ideological predisposition that favors laissez-faire economics was a virtual litmus test for
the appointment of regulatory officials in the Reagan Administration.
One can be certain that those prejudices and the desire to be true to the
President's program influenced the results of many rulemakings and
adjudications.
My own view is that when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), EPA, OSHA, and other agencies discharge mandates of
great political moment, governance would profit from some frank effort
to explain the interrelationship of science, politics, and rule of law methods. At present, an agency decisionmaker who anticipates judicial review is unlikely to cite political ideology or loyalty to the President's
program as a reason for official action, or even one of several reasons.
Instead, the political preferences and values are transmuted into expertise and legalisms by means of manipulating the boundaries between science, politics, and law.
For example, FERC concluded that despite consistent interpretations dating back to 1906, the statutory mandate that the agency assure
"reasonable rates" for oil pipelines did not require traditional utility rate
regulation, but only the mere monitoring of whatever prices deregulated
44
market forces might produce. 43 The D.C. Circuit was not impressed.
On its face, the agency's abrupt about-face was politically inspired. So,
why did the agency pretend that this was a matter of a newly enlightened
construction of broad statutory terms? Why not offer an obviously principled rationale based on a politically-rooted confidence in the efficacy of
markets, supported with some empirical evidence for its assertions that
intermodal, inter-fuel competition would do the trick?
Similarly, when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) accomplished its partial deregulation of deceptive advertising by scrapping a
long-standing practice of protecting gullible consumers as well as the
more discerning, "reasonable consumers, ' 45 the orders and public state43. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 734 F.2d 1486,
1490-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
44. Id. at 1510. The court held that FERC-set oil pipeline rate ceilings would be "egregiously
extortionate" if reached in practice, and that FERC had failed to demonstrate that market forces
could be relied on to keep prices at reasonable levels throughout the industry. Id.
45. See Charles of the Ritz v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
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ments should not have pretended that the law had always been such.
This was a change in direction, occasioned by the elections of 1980 and
the change of Commission members. 46 An articulated, policy-based confession of deregulation would have been more truthful, and probably
more productive of sensible public and congressional review.
As for judicial review, confessions of politics would serve three useful purposes. First, to the extent that an agency is free to declare that it
understands that expertise only partially justifies a given conclusion, and
that claims of special political values also necessarily undergird decisions,
the agency will feel less pressure to contrive answers within the science
paradigm. As a result, scientific evidence will more easily withstand
hard-look review. When a political choice is disguised as "science," the
ostensibly technical reasoning may appear arbitrary or flawed, thereby
inviting reversal. Second, by indicating its assessment of how scientific
rationales should control decisions, the agency focuses the public and
reviewing court on whether additional science (i.e., evidence) should be
required, and whether other scientific evidence militates against the
agency's decision. Common law evolution would develop rules for paradigm applicability and balance-how much politics is too much, how
little science is too little? Third, by declaring more carefully when it is
exercising discretion to achieve a politically desired result, the agency is
signalling to the public and Congress that the decision, for which the
administration expects to be accountable, reflects the workings of the
electoral process. It also communicates to the reviewing court that a
reversal will be tantamount to an overriding of a political decision, which
may well strike observers as a political act on the part of the court.
Consider the following paragraph in a statement of basis and purpose in connection with a hypothetical rulemaking:
The epidemiological studies indicate, with 80 percent confidence, that
a fifty-microgram exposure to xynothalic creostate is no more dangerous than a twenty-microgram exposure. But our survey of the industry suggests that the expected compliance cost per prevented injury is
$100,000 at the fifty-microgram level and almost twice that at the
twenty-microgram level. Although some rule making comments argue
that the added cost is a modest price for the added protection, we interpret the act as affording us discretion to strike a balance between
46. Reagan-appointed FrC Chairman James C. Miller III proposed a two-part definition of
deceptive acts and practices that would have required consumers to act reasonably in the circumstances. Michael Pertschuk, FTC Commissioner and former Chairman, disagreed with Miller's proposal, calling it an "effort to embody a conservative political ideology into the country's principal
consumer protection statute." FTC'sAuthority Over Deceptive Advertising, 1982: Hearingbefore the
Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1982) (statement of Michael Pertschuk); see also id. at 3 (statement of James
Miller).
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industry costs and worker protection, and we are unwilling to impose

the higher costs absent convincing evidence of added benefit. 47
Or, in an explanation of informal adjudicatory action:
The act does not specify criteria by which the secretary is to select the
thirty-five demonstration sites for the experimental housing program.
In addition to considering the various demographic and market factors

detailed elsewhere, we have consulted widely in an effort to allow as
many interested members of Congress as possible to feel some involvement in shaping the program, including through the participation of
their constituents. We have also been mindful of the importance of
building a broad base of interest
and support within the Congress for
48
programs of the department.
The statement reveals the agency's use of more than a computer
formula, and also the agency's view that the statute permits it to use
what I have elsewhere termed a "strong" or "electoral" form of the politics paradigm, rather than the weaker, politics-as-preferences form evident in the hypothetical rulemaking.49 Reviewing courts should credit
politics as an appropriate element of decisionmaking, subject to reasonable tests of conflict with science and law. 50 Of course, the conceptual
problems of the trichotomy make any precise description of the mix impossible. The most that can be said is that full disclosure of political
motivations would be an incremental improvement if doctrine affirmatively encouraged the disclosure of otherwise secret politics to promote
accountability and reduce casuistic distortion by agencies of the other
two paradigms.

IV.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, LEGAL THEORY, AND PRACTICAL
INVENTION

Having offered my view of the conventional project of administrative law, and having then characterized the trichotomy-based modus
operandi and failings of doctrine, I now turn to the third step of my
inquiry: As we undertake an elaboration of a more promising project for
administrative law, what is there to say for political ideology, for grand
legal theories, for practical invention, and for the connections among the
three realms?
47. C. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 191.
48. Id.
49. For a more detailed discussion of "harder look" review concerning paradigm disclosure,
mix, and quality, see id. at 169-212.
50. Evaluating the mix of paradigms, and developing useful guidance for when the mix should
be ruled unacceptable by a reviewing court, is key. For my attempt, see id. at 192-96.
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The Integration of Ideology, -Theory, and Invention

1. The New Deal. I look to history for guidance. New Deal warriors, many of them lawyers, 5 1 understood their task to be the renovation
of democratic capitalism, enabling it to overcome economic depression
and global totalitarianism. The menaces of bread lines and fascists,
Hoovervilles and empire-minded war machines drove leaders in both intellectual and public affairs to invent new institutions, new organizing
principles-a new public ideology to fit the new day, as those warriors
imagined it.
Adolph Berle, an influential New Deal theorist,5 2 argued that the

realities of corporate power make people and governments utterly dependent upon these entities, although the market forces that drive corporate
behavior are relatively impotent to impose the needed disciplines on their
power. Berle's skepticism about corporate self-control undergirds the effort to rethink the relationship between government and enterprise, and
his prescriptions for and advocacy of new doctrines and institutions of
public law controls over corporations.5 3 Professor Felix Frankfurter,
writing in 1930, emphasized the importance of avoiding wooden separation of powers formalism (those were not his words) to accommodate
what he understood to be "the demands of modern society."' 54 As a partial rebuttal to the charge that law obstructed the progress of govern51. See Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism:-Respondingto Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1226-27 n.18 (1931).
52. See Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 273 (1983) (assessing the impact of Berle's work).
53. For example:
[B]oth popular and educated opinion accepts in great measure the proposition that its government stands or falls in large degree upon its ability to bring about economic and social
results acceptable to its people.
Even the intimate matter of degree of profits is beginning to become a matter for
public concern....
The difference between the large private corporation and its predecessor, the smaller
enterprise, is yet undefined, but it is important. The latter is controlled considerably, if not
entirely, by the ordinary relations of property in a free economy. The former has, almost
without exception, moved into a position where it is subjected to limitations and controls of
an essentially political nature. This development arises from the companion fact that the
large corporation, having apparently become essential to the community, is relied on and,
with present techniques, it cannot be dispensed with....
Concentration exists, power exists, and the "free market" is not the continuous controlling influence it once may have been. To fill that deficiency a new force is emerging:
the quiet conscription of heavily concentrated enterprises into the status of quasi-public
services rather than private fortune-making concerns.
Berle, Corporations and the Modern State, in THE FTrURE OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 35, 35,
46-47 (1950); see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 309-13 (rev. ed. 1968) (arguing that because the modern corporation is potentially the new
dominant institution in the modern world, it should be subject to same tests of public benefit to
which other powerholders have traditionally been subject).
54. F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 1 (1930).
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ment, he argued that judicial responsiveness to problems of governance is
essential and virtuous:
In simple truth, the difficulties that government encounters from law
do not inhere in the Constitution. They are due to the judges who
interpret it. For, in the language of the present Chief Justice spoken
when he was Governor of New York, "we are under a Constitution,
but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.... ." That document
has ample resources for imaginative statesmanship, if judges have imagination for statesmanship. When seen through the eyes of a Mr. Justice Holmes, there emerges from the Constitution the conception of a
nation adequate to its national and international duties, consisting of
federated states possessed of ample power for the diverse uses of a civilized people. He has been mindful of the Union for which he fought;
he has been equally watchful to assure scope for the states upon which
the Union rests. He has found the Constitution equal to the needs of a
great nation at war, and adequate to the desires of a generous and
daring people at peace.55
James Landis, a New Deal Legal Realist who was central to the
56
theoretical and doctrinal elaboration of modern administrative law,
analogized the policy and management tasks that face a regulatory commission to the similar tasks that face a large industrial corporation. "The
significance of this comparison," he wrote, "is not that it may point to a
need for an expanding concept of the province of governmental regulation, but rather that it points to the form which governmental action
tends to take."' 57 Just as no corporation would adopt a separation of
powers for its organization and decisionmaking, "it is only intelligent
realism" for the commission charged with the stability of the corporation
"to follow the industrial rather than the political" model of organization.
"The dominant theme in the administrative structure is thus determined
not primarily by political conceptualism but rather by concern for an industry whose economic health has become a responsibility of
government.""8
Justice Brandeis's jurisprudence was also influenced by a deep appreciation of social realities and the demands of progress. As Charles
Beard stated in his 1930 essay:
55. Id. at 79-80.
56. For a study of Landis's life and accomplishments, see D. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS:
DEAN OF REGULATORS (1980).

57. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11 (1938). Landis gives several examples of
how the rise of particular agencies and regulatory schemes was occasioned by public concern for "a
general social and economic problem," and how these agencies and schemes "were called into being
when the political power of our democratic institutions found it necessary to exercise some control
over the varying phases of our economic life." Id. at 16.
58. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).

Vol. 1991:561]

THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS

Mr. Justice Brandeis, like every other judge, entered upon his responsibilities with a fairly coherent picture in his mind of what he wished
American society to represent and become. It is true that he wrote no
systematic treatise on sociology before taking on the ermine. Nor was
he given to that logical perfection which usually eventuates in Utopia.
Yet from his writings and activities ...

can be constructed in bold

outlines a mosaic of the convictions and facts that largely determined
his approach to controversial questions before the Court.5 9
Beard goes on to mention Brandeis's familiar views: defense of individual enterprises and restraint of monopolies; effective regulation of utilities
in defense of consumer interests; strong trade unions; social legislation to
protect wage-earners; and interpretation of the Constitution's "convenient vagueness" to sustain social legislation if fairly calculated to accomplish a reasonable purpose. 6°
The lawyers at the center and periphery of both the New Deal and
its Progressive foreshadowing can fairly be described as part of the Legal
Realist school-regardless of whether they were self-consciously part of
any jurisprudential camp. These reformers were driven to institutional
and doctrinal invention by the practical import of their social critique.
The legal theories they embraced, such as a repudiation of the publicprivate distinction and the eschewing of separation of powers formalism,
were a product of some felt need to remake government. As Rexford
Tugwell stated in an address to the Federation of Bar Associations of
Western New York: "Government, or any part of it, is not in itself
something; it is for something. It must do what we expect of it or it must
be changed so that it will."' 61 As though tutored by Frankfurter, Tugwell
wrote that constitutionality is not "a tangible fact, undeviating and precise," but rather "a legalistic expression of the prevailing political and
economic philosophy." 62 The old constitutional conception of government called to mind a policeman; government's role entailed minimal
intrusion on private affairs and a laissez-faire reliance on the invisible
hand. With a Realist's characteristic bite, Tugwell charged:
The jig is up. The cat is out of the bag. There is no invisible hand.
There never was. If the depression has not taught us that, we are incapable of education. Time was when the anarchy of the competitive
59. Beard, supra note 1, at xix.
60. Id.; see also Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935) (holding that
Oregon regulation mandating specific shape and size of containers for berries was not arbitrary or
capricious because it bore a reasonable relationship to the goal of consumer protection).
61. R. TUGWELL, THE BATrLE FOR DEMOCRACY 3 (1935). In his defense of controversial
New Deal legislation against constitutional criticisms, Tugwell integrated a compelling policy argument, rooted in economic and social observations, with a critique of orthodox economic and legal
theories and a prescription for their replacement with what we would now term the administrative
state.
62. Id. at 12.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1991:561

struggle was not too costly. Today it is tragically wasteful. It leads to
disaster. We must now supply a real and visible guiding hand to do
the task which that mythical, nonexistent, invisible agency was supposed to perform but never did.
And there is the importance of the rediscovery of the Constitution. We are turning our back on the policeman doctrine of government and recapturing the vision of a government equipped to fight and
overcome the forces of economic disintegration. A strong government
with an executive amply empowered by legislative delegation is the one
way out of our dilemma, and
on to the realization of our vast social
63
and economic possibilities.
In this one brief passage we see the integration of three elements:
First, a political ideology that responds to depression and economic concentration; second, a legal theory that challenges the nineteenth-century
formalism that, under Lochner" and the nondelegation doctrine, was antithetical to the political ideology; and third, doctrinal and institutional
inventions to accommodate and support the particular conception of
progress.
It was no coincidence that lawyers were prominent in these developments, that legal institutions were both instruments and objects of our
own velvet revolution, 65 or that renovated legal doctrine served as midwife to the implementation of the modem administrative state. Those
leading the New Deal appreciated and promoted law's mediating role in
social change.
Constitutional law scholars have paid careful attention to the search
for first principles of politico-legal theory. Many goals and hopes motivate such work, the most practical of which is to inform the process of
constitutional interpretation. There are often implications, too, for all of
public law, including subconstitutional judicial review of agency action.
My contention, however, is that such legal theories are insufficient to
provide any determinate shape to a program for reform of either governance or legal doctrine. The legal theory must flow from and be integrated
with a politicalideology, much as we can, in retrospect, understand the
New Deal revolution as an organic amalgam of politics and law, institutions and theory, serendipity and design. This proposition seems valid at
three levels, which can be stated in order of increasing subtlety. First,
legal theory must have a related and embracing political ideology to find
a welcoming climate of public and elite opinion for the theory's prescrip63. Id. at 14-15.
64. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65. The name "velvet revolution" has been used to describe the nonviolent democratic overthrow of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. See Tagliabue, Upheaval In the East; Prague's
Velvet Revolutionaries Recall John Lennon, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
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tions at the level of doctrine and reform. Second, the companion ideology, or sociopolitical critique, provides the test of whether the
prescriptions are sound. Third, the theory itself is likely incapable of
generating concrete or useful prescriptions, and thus flawed, unless the
theory is informed in an immediate sense by an ideology that can provide
a direction and purpose to the abstract reasoning.
It is common for people of action, including lawyers, to heap skepticism upon theorists who seem to have little interest in practical details or
in the applications of their abstractions. The writings of these theorists
are not designed to invite the attention of those of a more practical bent
who might be skilled at working out the applications to everyday affairs.
So, for example, we expect practical skepticism those writers who seek to
renovate legal liberalism, revive classical republicanism, or invent
postmodern legal theories. My criticism of those theorists is different.
Their problem is not one of linear incompleteness-with failure to follow
through by deriving sufficiently concrete and convincing doctrinal or institutional prescriptions from their theories. Rather, their failure stems
from a lack of wholly understanding the domain of public law. I suggest
that these theorists embark upon a new path-a path that I imagine as a
circle with the following component parts:
Political Ideology: The theorists should develop an empirical understanding of social and political experience, and an ideology that interprets that experience and offers a normative critique. The political
ideology, in my terms, does not flow from a theory of society or of
personality-it may even be antecedent to theory. The ideology is a
response to the tensions, or "intimations," within unsatisfactory socioeconomic arrangements. (One example is the New Deal vision, rooted
in Progressivism.)
Theory: The theorists should develop a legal or politico-legal theory
about the interrelationship of law and sociopolitical life, particularly in
constitutional matters. (One example is Legal Realism, together with
thorough critiques of formalism, the public-private distinction, and
economic laissez-faire.)
PracticalInvention: The theorist should apply the theory to prescribe
or invent institutions and doctrines that reflect the ideological critique
of experience. (One example is the New Deal program of an expanded
administrative apparatus, modem administrative law, and a legislative
program including the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.)
Repeat the cycle: The theorist should test the practical inventions
against experience, such that there is a continual process of ideological
development, theoretical enterprise, and institutional or doctrinal reform (or revolution).
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If, as I believe, the success of each stage depends on the others, the
theoretical exegesis so popular in academic writing will not yield practical invention unless there has been (or there accompanies) a passage
through empiricism and ideological critique that serves to motivate and
ground both theory and invention. When we turn to the work of most
contemporary theorists, however, that passage is absent.
One can, in fact, discover an intellectual pedigree for my thesis. Aristotle argued that the value of political philosophy was a function of its
rootedness in an understanding of the wide range of matters of political
significance. Moreover, this understanding was to be within a comparative framework that permits a scientific appreciation not of one regime
(by which he meant sociopolitical makeup and manner of governance),
but rather of the many possibilities suggested by a variety of regimes. 66
A philosopher's perspective, then, is thoroughly informed by experience
and prudence, and yet at some distance from the politician who, riveted
to the immediate, is unable to imagine alternative institutions.
This duality of "groundedness while removed" is precisely the virtue
that de Tocqueville ascribed to the seventeenth-century French writers
whom he credited with inspiring revolutions on two continents. Unlike
their British contemporaries, wrote de Tocqueville, the French writers
were not personal participants in public affairs as officials wielding authority; they were, however, deeply committed students of the details of
governmental and social life. 67 This characterization may be in part de
Tocqueville's projection onto Montesquieu and others of his own empirical predilections.
Nevertheless, the truth of de Tocqueville's message seems irrefutable: visionary prescriptions of philosophers must be initially informed by
and then eventually set beside practicalities, lest their visions produce
failed or perverted revolutions. This latter pathology is de Tocqueville's
account for the unhappy turns in post-revolutionary France, where the
absence of a popular political culture meant there was nothing to temper
the philosopher's literary visions with what Aristotle would have termed
66. See Lord, Aristotle, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 118, 130-33 (L. Strauss & J.
Cropsey 3d ed. 1987) (citing ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS AND POLITICS 101-29 (D.

Chase trans. 3d ed. 1920)).
67. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 170. This may be a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation. My reading is that, although de Tocqueville faults the prescriptions of Locke and Montesquieu (because they were dangerous when applied without editing by French revolutionaries), he
found their worldly focus attractive in comparison to German philosophers. In my terms, these
theorists lacked a strong empirical connection between the realms of institutional invention and
ideological critique. In America, perhaps, this connection was provided by revolutionaries who,
although familiar with the continental political philosophers, had a degree of political experience and
perspective that their French counterparts lacked.
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prudence or practical reason. (Perhaps the same may now be said of
literary Marxism and its ultimately failed revolutions.)
My emphasis on the realm of politics resonates with the intellectual
and political strategy of Legal Realists who participated in progressive
and New Deal reform. Although their empiricism and skeptical stance
towards formalism may be understood as hostility to formalism and conceptualism, it seems wrong to presume that the Realists stood apart from
theory. Instead, their critiques of governance and of socioeconomic conditions, married to their inventive challenge against doctrines and institutions, were often explicitly directed at such abstract constructs as laissezfaire, separation of powers, the public-private distinction, and legal science. Their competing politico-legal theory was perhaps only implicit or
inchoate, defined more by what it was not. The affirmative strands are
69
6
vague: perhaps Tugwell's theme of cooperation; perhaps Brandeis's
or Douglas's 70 suspicion of economic concentration; or perhaps Landis's 7 1 or Frankfurter's 72 dislike of reified constitutional structuresstructures that thwart not just the democratically adopted means, but the
very ends as well.
If the Legal Realists were a bit thin on political theory (by today's
standards), it was understandable as a tactical shift of ground in response
to the hegemony of the conceptualism they found in the economic and
constitutional theories to which they were opposed. In light of the success of their political program, it is difficult to fault their tactics. One
may complain that an overly skeptical stance toward theory may have
prevented the completion of their triumphs over laissez-faire and the
73
wooden separation of powers.
I am persuaded that as long as we continue to define the enterprise
of contemporary administrative law solely by the antidiscretion project
and separation of powers doctrine, administrative law will hinder the reinvigoration of government, rather than act as the instrument of democratic evolution. The alternative is a redefined project for administrative
law integrated with, if not derived from, a broader effort to renovate governance. That project will, in turn, be rooted in a compelling critique
and political ideology, perhaps as sweeping as the New Deal itself, rather
than some technocratic aspiration for good government. Therefore, it is
68. See R. TUGWELL, supra note 61, at 3-16.
69. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 568 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part).
70. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 n.1 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
71. See J. LANDIS, supra note 57, at 123-55.
72. See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 54, at 36-80.
73. The former enjoys renewed vigor in Reaganism and in law and economics; the latter, as we
have seen, continues to confuse administrative law.
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interesting but ultimately futile to construct a theoretical stance towards
doctrinal reform without making explicit the political ideology and, in an
abstract sense, the political program that will constitute the institutional
arrangements and norms through which one hopes to make the theory
come alive. This assertion (I understand it is only that) holds whether
the subject is statutory interpretation, scope of judicial review, federalism, or congressional checks on the Commander in Chief.74 There must
be politics, as there was for the Legal Realists and for the Framers.
2. Reaganism. In considering the desirability and feasibility of
renovating administrative law, we should bear in mind that our efforts to
develop the practical implications of legal theory are embedded in a matrix of possibilities that are shaped by prevailing political ideologies. By
ideology I mean a cluster of conceptions or attitudes that define what is
generally embraced in public policy, political program, or judicial action.7 5 Since the New Deal, only one distinctive and successful political
ideology has emerged: Reaganism. Yet Reaganism is more than one
man, one administration, or one political party. Public figures who have
espoused elements of Reaganism include such a diverse lot as George
Wallace (inveighing against Washington),7 6 Richard Nixon (advocating
revenue sharing and block grants to shrink the role of the national government), 77 Jimmy Carter (reversing the post-Vietnam decline in defense
spending), 78 and even Ted Kennedy (supporting transportation deregula79
tion in the mid-1970s).
The elements of Reaganism are:
" A nouveau -libertarian, anti-bureaucracy suspicion of all governmental activity, which, because national government is more distant, is
particularly manifest as an anti-federalist suspicion (verging on antipathy) of national domestic programs;
" Faith in markets and supply-side incentives, especially in contrast to
government regulation;
74. I have no well-considered instincts about whether the argument that I build can be fruitfully applied to the individual rights and liberties context.
75. See Beer, In Search of a New Public Philosophy, in THE NEw AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 5 (A. King ed. 1978).
76. See T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972, at 120-21 (1973).
77. See 27 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 23 (1971) (describing President Nixon's proposal for revenue
sharing in his State of the Union Address).
78. See Clark, Salt I1 Treaty-It Won't Stop Rise in Defense Spending, NAT'L J., June 16, 1979,

at 984.
79. See Cohen, CarterShows Who's the Boss When it Comes to Airline Deregulation, NAT'L J.,
Mar. 5, 1977, at 352.
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" A romantic invocation of loosely defined "traditional family values";
and
" A combative, anticommunist conception of national security, with
America resurgent, and even defiant, in the world order.
The implications of Reaganism are not as obvious. Some of its manifestations do not appear partisan or even political in the conventional
sense. But this powerful intellectual framework shapes, however invisibly, the limits of contemporary discourse about governance. Indeed,
Reaganism's power to shape our discourse is evidence of the success of
Reaganism as political ideology.
What principles can we derive from this nouveau-libertarian, antifederalist, anti-bureaucratic, laissez-faire spirit of Reaganism? I propose
the following possibilities:
" The autonomy of markets and private actors is preferred over the
regulatory impositions of government;
" Political decisionmaking that curbs government activity is favored
over bureaucratic expansion and regulatory activism; and
" "Traditional values," such as law and order, trump broad claims for
civil liberties.
Notably, judicial passivity is not clearly implied by the ideological
tenets of Reaganism-the role of courts is just as likely instrumental, so
that deference or intervention would depend upon which posture would,
in the particular circumstances, advance the values of anti-federalism,
laissez-faire efficiency, and so forth. This instrumental calculation may
appear arbitrary, but it is, in fact, quite principled within its ideological
framework. Moreover, it is relatively visible to the scrutiny of commentators and, for example, administration officials and senators deciding
whether to appoint and approve a particular judge or justice.
Against this we must recognize that the life tenure provisions of article III mean that our judicial corps, no less than the legal literature and
doctrine, have an archaeological quality like so many layers of ideological fashion. A substantial, although dwindling, number of judges remain
sympathetic to the New Deal paradigm, whether consciously or otherwise. Those sympathies seem tempered by an awareness of the basic implications of interest group pluralism and of policy science. Judges of the
new Reagan paradigm will likely adopt different understandings of public law; indeed, they are already doing so. For these judges, post-New
Deal sensibilities suggest an emphasis on individual autonomy and a prejudice against activist government bureaucracies.
How does this help us understand administrative law? A case such
as Chevron, widely read as an abdication of judicial responsibility to in-
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terpret the law, can instead be read as the Supreme Court's conceptually
flawed effort to control the inclinations of some lower court judges to
impose their politically unaccountable, unreconstructed New Deal
prejudices to push the bureaucracy toward an aggressive regulatory
stance. Thus, there is an affiance of antifederalist judicial appointees
with their kindred spirits among the political appointees in the executive
branch.
B.

Waves of Change-From Reagan to Postmodernism?

To summarize, one might view the first wave of modem public legalism as the New Deal's allied elements:
In the politicalideology realm, this was latter-day Progressivism, influenced by social democratic sensibilities, which formed a critique that
portrayed Democratic Capitalism as ailing from economic concentration, exploitation, and ultimately depression. This ideology led to the
most massive political realignment in four decades.
In the theoreticalrealm, there was Legal Realism, Keynesianism, antiformalism, the methods of empiricism and, perhaps, the pragmatism
of, say, Dewey.
In the practicalinvention realm, the New Deal provided the post-formalist enthusiasm for the activist administrative state with commingled powers. Administrative law served simultaneously to promote
and to constrain those institutions.
In my terms, the New Deal was successful and enduring in all three
realms because all three were present.
The second major wave is Reaganism:
In the politicalideology realm, we have conservative and neoconservative attacks on economic and social regulation, and generally on domestic activism by the federal government. Supply-side incentives are
preferred and there is a sharp preference for autonomy over paternalism, however well-intentioned.
In the theoreticalrealm, we have a normative political theory with libertarian strains, a positive political theory stressing interest-group pluralism, and policy science grounded in free market models.
In the practical invention realm, we have deregulation, shifts in national spending, devolution of responsibilities to the states, and a
remolding of the judiciary to be less sympathetic to private parties who
seek, through the courts, to impose regulatory burdens (either economic or social) on private enterprise. 80
80. Like any sketch of intellectual or social history, there are oddities and loose ends. For
example, the legal process school of thought seems to me a part of the New Deal wave (just after the
crest?), whereas public choice theory is part of the backdrop for Reaganism's second-wave skepticism about governmental processes. In the political realms of ideology and invention, Richard
Nixon and Jimmy Carter strike me as transition figures (moving us from then to now), as do Justice
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This second wave of thought, Reaganism, thus includes two related
strands with a less institutional, more atomistic conception of society
than their intellectual forbearers. One strand adopts the models of pluralism and interest-group competition; the other emphasizes the descriptive and normative importance of markets and of homo economicus-a
high-browed, empty-hearted, post-Neanderthal species driven by incentives. These two schools are similar in that the basic unit of analysis is a
primitive, self-interested individual, and in both theories any overarching
ethical conception of the good is not only exogenous and problematic in
1
shaping individual behavior, but seemingly irrelevant
Because these themes are unsatisfactory to many theorists, a third
wave is developing. The reaction in political theory to the atomizing,
rationalistic conceptions of interest group pluralism and of
microeconomic analysis has been remarkable, although intellectually incomplete and politically impotent. The growing attention to more communitarian, post-liberal theories has been puzzling to first-wave lawyers
and legal scholars of a more traditional mold, no less than the early,
second-wave tracings of law and economics or public choice theory were
viewed twenty-five years ago as curiosities, if not pollution, in the literature. Yet today, we know there are judges who are importantly influenced by these second-wave perspectives, as well as lawmakers in the
political branches to whom these arguments-economic efficiency, public
choice theory, interest group bargaining, and so forth-are important,
familiar, and persuasive.8 2 The third wave post-liberal theories will also
find resonance with judges if the implications of those theories are given
concrete meaning in the work of the law and the design of institutions.
Put differently, the post-liberal work in the theoretical realm must find
concrete expression in the practical invention realm. My claim is that
this will be difficult, and perhaps impossible, unless there is also an allied
enterprise in the realm of political ideology and critique.
Critical Legal Studies and civic republicanism are two important
strands in this developing, third wave. 83 On a practical level, the more
intriguing of the two thus far is civic republicanism, i.e., the resurgence
Stevens and Senator Lloyd Bentsen. Like rolling waves in a rough sea, there is a slow build up and
much confusion in the troughs.
81. Welfare economics refers to a social welfare function, but it is not important to homo
economicus. A conception of the good is also problematic in postmodern theories. I think, however,
that it is a different question. In postmodern theories the good is deeply and inevitably contested,
but not at all irrelevant to individual or collective local motivations.
82. Judges who have taught at the University of Chicago come immediately to mind. See, eg.,
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEcrIVE (1976).
83. There is actually far more published feminist legal theory than civic republicanism, but it
does not generally address the structural aspects of public law.
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of interest in the possibility of civic virtue, public deliberation, publicregarding behavior, and freedom as and through self-governance by individuals and collectives. Compared to civic republicanism, Critical Legal
Studies has been more impressively influential in both legal scholarship
and teaching. Both schools have very respectable pedigrees, as did the
second-wave theories. Critical Legal Studies has cousins in intellectual
movements in disparate academic disciplines, as a species of postmodernism. However, its major expression through the late 1980s, the indeterminacy thesis, seems to have run its course. Several critical theorists
have turned self-consciously to the challenges of invention, though ar84
guably with a somewhat utopian cast.
Civic republicanism was, at least for a time, thought by some to hold
great promise of contributing to a positive program of legal and social
reform. 8 5 It is there that we might expect to find suggestive conceptual
seeds of a third-wave renovation of administrative law as part of a larger
enterprise of renovating governance. I find a definition and framework
offered by my colleague Frank Michelman to be especially helpful.
Drawing on the seventeenth-century social theorist James Harrington,
Michelman discerns a "deep tradition" of civic republicanism. The critical passages from Michelman provide:
We can now see the classical Harringtonian republican conception as
composed of seven principles or impulses: (i) self-government; (ii)
practical deliberation or dialogue; (iii) equality (of ruling and being
ruled); (iv) antistatism (immediacy); (v) rationally cognizable values
("the general good"); (vi) a mechanistic, role-differentiated constitution-balanced government and proprietary independence ("civic virtue"); and (vii) action by promulgation of laws.
At the heart of the conception, motivating the whole, is the first principle: positive freedom realized as self-government through politics.
Structured about the conception are three matched pairs of impulses in
tension (il-v, iii-vi, iv-vii). The first member of each pair expresses a
subjective or volitional moment of self-government. The second expresses a corresponding objective or cognitive moment. The three subjectivist impulses (ii, iii, iv) together describe republican's participatory
84. See RL UNGER, POLrIcs: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987). My colleagues Charles Fried and Laurence Tribe, each a prominent figure in liberal legalism, have made
several trips to Eastern Europe to provide advice to the new democracies. The surprising thing is
that so too have my thoroughly postmodern colleagues Duncan Kennedy and David Kennedy. The
contributions of the Harvard Law School are more complicated to characterize than the contributions of the Harvard Economics Department. We at the Law School are comparatively more
postmodern (or, at least, more confused).
85. See Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695
(1989); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Setf-Government, 100
HARV. L. REv. 4, 17-55 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 68-85 (1985); Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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side. The three objectivist ones (v, vi, vii) together describe its lawful
side.
The objectivist moments-common good, civic virtue, and legalityare all essential to the Harringtonian conception but not fundamental
within it.... The possibility of self-government itself has the visionary
status not of an asserted fact but rather of a felt necessity.86
In Michelman's interpretation, self-governance is the fundamental

aspiration, and civic deliberation is a crucial element of that because it
both effectuates a civic culture (including the consideration of what is the

public good) and makes possible government by and for the governed. It
is this deliberative element, and the aspirational focus on the public pur-

pose, continually and immediately discerned, which can serve as the kernel for rethinking aspects of public law. Yet, the rethinking of public
law is not yet complete, despite the best efforts of such diverse and able

scholars as Cass Sunstein, Jerry Frug, and Mark Tushnet.
Can civic republicanism in fact carry the burden we have before us?

To appraise its prospects, there is no better specimen for study than Cass
Sunstein's recent book,8 7 where scholarship takes a courageous plunge
toward proposals of a relatively concrete sort. Building upon a finely
argued, intellectually eclectic, and ringing endorsement of the ambitious
regulatory state, Sunstein pushes us to consider reforms of public law
that will promote the success of that state. His special focus is the task of
statutory interpretation 88-a worthy target in view of its central role in

public law doctrine and theory. Nevertheless, there is fundamentally
conservative quality to Sunstein's effort. His purpose seems to be the
perfection of the New Deal model of governance by, for example, lifting
from the economic efficiency models of contemporary policy analysis (an
86. Michelman, supra note 85, at 47. He distinguishes this deep tradition from a somewhat
corrupted form that some scholars have identified with the American anti-federalists, or "Opposition
ideology":
Opposition ideology began as a language of conservative political grievance, prompted by
the post-Restoration emergence of modem executive government as an actively transformative social force. What had been a diction of visionary aspiration became also one of the
complaint of the moment. Moreover, the complaint was not, at bottom, that modem government denied its citizens the experience of ruling and being ruled, but that it represented
a disturbance or threat to one's personal position in the general order of society, and to
related notions of traditional right. Antistatism remained in the rhetoric, but its sense was
transformed. In Harringtonian thought the sovereign state, as a government of rulers separated from the ruled, is objectionable as alien authority, denying self-government. In Opposition thought the executive state, with its concentration of means and influence,
becomes suspect as excessive power, endangering the interests and rights of subjects. For
Harringtonians, sovereignty is conceptually the antithesis of political liberty. For the Opposition, government is operationally the antagonist of individual position, wealth, and
right.
Id. at 48.
87. C. SUNsTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY

STATE (1990).
88. See Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the RegulatoryState, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
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aspect of second-wave theory) to remind us of the familiar prescriptions
against regulatory excess or inappropriate governmental tools-using
rigid standards when incentive schemes would be "better," and so forth.
Thus, Sunstein marries rededication to New Deal ends with a fresh sensitivity to the means employed-a sensitivity that reflects the force of Reaganism's critique of the regulatory state. When we turn to the specific
doctrinal and institutional prescriptions, there is an inescapably, overwhelmingly incremental quality to them. 89
The various civic republican writings thus far strike me in one of
two ways: Either they have a utopian quality, or they have a general
reformist cast that raises doubt about whether the brew is potent enough
to address the deeper, thorough-going problems of governance. 90 Both
difficulties are symptomatic of insufficient connection with the realms of
political ideology and practical invention. 91 Contrary to the hopes of the
civic republicans, however, our doctrinal commitments cannot adequately substitute for a complete retooling of administrative doctrine,
even if they are rooted in the sacred realm of proceduralism, Legal Process analysis, and the New Deal. My tentative assessment is that as we
struggle to move from the realm of theory to that of institutional and
doctrinal innovation, we will fail to achieve a distinctive program unless
both theory and innovation are built on a platform of sharp, distinctive
critique within the realm of political ideology. There is, perhaps, more
energy and clearer direction to be found through a frontal assault on
Reaganism, than in a defensive maneuver intended to forestall the final
decline of the New Deal ideology.
Richard Fallon has suggested that the republican revival is problematic: "If a theory hews too close to classical republicanism, it risks
foundering on modem philosophical sensibilities. Yet if, on the other
hand, it departs too far from the classical paradigm, it hazards the loss of
republican distinctiveness. ' 92 The strategy seems clear to me, because it
is so familiar from the legal process tradition: To avoid offending liberal
sensibilities, the temptation is to emphasize the procedural and delibera89. This is probably the mark of useful reform-minded scholarship.
90. For other examples of civic republican scholarship verging on the realm of doctrinal and
institutional invention, see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1980) (foreshadowing of republicanism); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE W. 1539
(1988); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
91. For an interesting effort by Michael Sandel to apply (implicitly) his political philosophy to
the practical task of Democratic party ideology, see Sandel, Democrats and Community: A Public
Philosophyfor American Liberalism, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1988, at 20. I think he has it about
three-quarters right.
92. Fallon, supra note 85, at 1725.
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tive elements of republicanism, rather than some objectivist notion of the
public good. This procedural dodge is also consistent with the Realist
and CLS understanding that legal rules have an inescapably subjective
and political content; this contestable subjective content is made less obvious if rules are framed in procedural terms.
The proceduralist orientation of much civic republican scholarship
gives rise, for example, to the objection that there is too little affirmative
commitment to what legal liberals and political progressives alike consider valuable individual "rights," or to social progress of any particular
sort. Too much is up for grabs in the civic republican vision of public
deliberation and self governance by "undominated" individuals. Furthermore, the possibility of this process yielding what any of us believes,
ex ante, to be a just order seems remote given our experience of diversity
and conflict in communities of any significant size.93 Professor Mashaw
captured some of these issues well:
The crucial question has to do with the concrete meaning of republicanism for American public law and public institutions.
The task for republicans involves at least two sorts of theorizing.
First, we must sort out our normative commitments and give them
determinate shape. Otherwise republicanism as a normative theory
will give us no purchase on the problems that we confront.... [Second,] [w]e must be able to specify how legal and political institutionsfrom electoral voting to legislative processes to judicial decisionmaking-work or can be made to work. Otherwise we cannot choose
rules
94
or construct institutions that will pursue our normative ends.
These difficulties-proceduralism, normative emptiness, unreal vision of political discourse-illustrate why civic republicanism is an unstable way station for something else in the realm of theory. The
difficulties are largely attributable to the fact that these theorists do not
generally look for motivation in the realm of practical sociopolitical critique, or what I have termed political ideology. 95 Without such a critique, modem liberal sensibilities make it uncomfortable to assert
normative propositions as the basis for a theoretical framework. The politically successful theories of the New Deal and, indeed, the American
Revolution, had this positive and normative quality. There were, in
those great moments, political ends from the realm of ideology, under93. See Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1718 (1988) (idea of multiple
perspectives not even theoretically compatible with republicanism's concept of an overarching common good). To be of any value, after all, a revived republicanism must have applications outside
small communities of utopian scale.
94. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation,97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1685 (1988).
95. To the extent they have such critiques, they are inchoate or utopian. See M. TUSHNET,
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
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stood as political, that permitted theories about law and the state to have
actual, real-world effects.
The republican revival, then, seems trapped in a familiar legal liberalism. It may not be radical enough to be distinctive; its radical potential
is limited because it has not come to us as part of a powerful critique of
anything important in the world.
If we need radicalism of some sort, do postmodern sensibilities suggest promising directions? Frank Michelman is again helpful:
By a postmodemist frame of mind I just mean a certain, contemporarily recognizable set of attitudes, tastes, styles, reflecting a certain sense of how to know, how to live, how to be in the world. I
mean, say, preferring the "transformativity" (self-critical potency) of
knowledge over its "performativity" or "effectivity" (instrumental potency). I mean a taste for the discursive agonistic of metaphor, paradox, reversal, disruption. I mean a reach for the division, the
incompletion, the "otherness" in oneself. I mean valorizing patchwork, bricolage, Neurath's boat, meaning on the fly, horizons endlessly
receding. I mean embracing indeterminacy: not in the sense that
meaning is absent or null but in the sense that meaning is local, conventional, relative to purpose, fluid, transient, disruptible. I mean a
sustained self-consciousness
about the constructedness and vulnerabil96
ity of all our discourses.
Needless to say, appealing and challenging though this may be as an
intellectual method, it is quite some distance from the realms of political
ideology and practical invention. Those, of course, are not Michelman's
present venue. But to coexist comfortably with postmodern sensibilities,
what characteristics would need be present in a successful contribution
within the realm of political ideology, or for useful doctrinal prescriptions in the realm of practical invention?
I offer three tentative suggestions (which I state in a far more abstract form than is required of political ideology). First, as a critique of
social and political arrangements, transformation and fluidity would be
preferred over stability and hierarchy. This may have both procedural
96. Michelman, Postmodern Constitutionalism?, (draft manuscript) (available from author)
("The naive claim that I want to put forward as a beginning is that one can perfectly well bring such

a temperament to bear, normatively, on American constitutional argument at all the familiar levels
of method, doctrine and decision."); see also R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSrrY-ANT-NECESSITARIAN
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 67 (1987) ("Because the formative
contexts arise out of numerous intersecting trajectories of change rather than from a single, overriding dynamic, deeply rooted in practical and psychological forces, we stand a better chance of changing them. We can see how easily many of these past sequences might have turned out in other
ways."); R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATIoN AND ITs TASK 5 (1987) ("The aim is not to
show that we are free in any ultimate sense and somehow unrestrained by causal influences upon our
conduct. It is to break loose from a style of social understanding that allows us to explain ourselves
and our societies only to the extent we imagine ourselves helpless puppets of the social worlds we
build and inhabit or of the lawlike forces that have supposedly brought these worlds into being.").
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and substantive elements: the procedural element recognizing, for example, the republican aims of deliberation as a civic enterprise and a similar
structural emphasis on dialogue and dialectic among the branches and
levels of government; the substantive element recognizing, for example,
the civic sinfulness of enduring racial and sexual hierarchy, or of inherited poverty.
Second, in rejecting the atomistic individualism of Reaganism, a
postmodernist theory might look for individual fulfillment and societal
transformation to be linked through participation and engagement. This
implies a critique not only of radical antistatism, but also of the abysmal
participation in politics and civic voluntarism. It also suggests that the
processes of governance must be less alienating and bureaucratically re97
moved from citizens.
Third, the critique of governance, and the prescriptions for doctrines, would rekindle the Realists' attack on formalism, but direct that
same skepticism toward any stable set of institutional arrangements. We
would question the tremendous election bias that favors congressional
incumbents and the judicial deference to imaginary agency expertise; we
would challenge the religious fervor of free-marketeers as well as the naivet6 of advocates for sweeping economic and social welfare interventions. This need not be carried so far as to produce continuous chaos,
but it must be carried far enough to pose an effective counter-impulse
against natural conservatism and inertia that impede progress and attention to growing economic and social crises.
V.
A.

AN ALTERNATIVE PROJECT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
SOUND GOVERNANCE

The Twin Challenges: Theory and Governance

In his Article for this symposium, Cass Sunstein proposes refocusing
administrative law scholarship away from the problems of agency discretion and judicial review. His preferred focus is the discovery of general
principles of when and how regulatory regimes fail in substance, and the
promotion of an awareness of these principles. 98 With this, we can easily
imagine a steadily growing body of prescriptions for program design and
administration, with useful implications for statutes, regulations, and the
97. One can see the symptoms of alienation at any meeting of a local school board, in the
corridors outside the House Ways & Means Committee hearing room, and in the widely shared
perception that public power is captured by special interests.
98. Sunstein, AdministrativeSubstance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 608; see also C. SUNSTEIN, supra
note 87, at 74-110. For other examples of this form of scholarship, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); J.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983).
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processes of policy development and implementation. Sunstein's self-described audience is legislators and bureaucrats, but he also believes that
judges informed of these principles might understand their responsibilities differently. For example, the substantive logic of cost-effectiveness
might be incorporated into scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" rubric of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 99 As a
general matter, the content and ambitions of Sunstein's work are certainly correct. But in what sense is it responsive to the maladies of administrative law, or of governance?
As to the maladies, administrative law, as conventionally defined,
cannot easily accommodate heightened attention to substance-especially substance imported from the policy sciences or other disciplines, as
long as judges and lawyers are locked in a separation of powers framework from which they derive their role definitions and doctrinal tools of
analysis, argument, and decision. The suggestion that a lawyer or a
court insist that an agency demonstrate that its decision has been made
in light of a state-of-the-art application of decision analysis or cost-benefit
techniques strikes us as odd, adventuresome, or imperialistic only because we believe there is an important difference between the science paradigm and the adjudicatory fairness paradigm. With these imagined
boundaries shaping our personal roles and institutional powers, a lawyer
has no more standing to insist that regulations be cost effective than does,
say, a dentist. Or so the argument might go.
I reject this formulation for two reasons. The most elementary is
that administrative lawyers, and especially judges, unlike dentists, are
steeped in the ways of public administration. The program of study and
focus recommended by Sunstein would make us more so. One need only
chat with a prototypical "Washington lawyer" about the nature of her
practice, and the range of advice provided to clients, to demonstrate that,
as a sociological matter, the scope of a lawyer's expertise exceeds the
range of computerized legal databases and professional education
seminars.
The more important point is that reliance on the separation of powers ethos for role definitions, or for institutional legitimacy, raises once
again the conceptual flaws in the structure of the doctrines themselves.
We cannot escape either the boundary problem or the attributive duality
that undermines the persuasiveness of doctrinal argument and invite result-oriented lawyering shrouded in law-speak. We cannot escape the
dualities unless we search for alternatives to the traditional dogmas. The
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). See Sunstein, supra note 98, at 642. I agree with this specific
point.
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trichotomy creates the malleability, and hence the weakness, of traditional doctrine.
Consider a hypothetical OSHA health regulation. In reference to
this regulation, I have elsewhere written:
I would not object to a court requiring the agency to evaluate regulatory alternatives using cost-benefit analysis or the Ames test for bacterial mutagenicity or to do so in terms of impact on each of several
classes of affected individuals or firms. These matters seem substantive
and certainly inappropriate for courts steeped in separation of powers
ethos. But if a judge is persuaded that action without such analysis
might well be unsound, the court should require it: When an accessible norm of sound decisionmaking exists, or when the court can attempt to formulate one without prejudice to the power of agency or
legislature to correct a judicial misconception, a conscientious judge
should act on personal conviction. i °
To be sure, this was written with an eye toward radical provocation.
Sunstein's theme is not dissimilar, although he makes his arguments for
improved regulatory performance more palatable by suggesting that his
primary audiences are in the political branches-making his suggestions
for a transformation of judicial role sotto voce.
If the framework of legitimacy for judicial and administrative action
provided by the separation of powers themes'0 1 is conceptually problematic, why accept it as a constraint on roles or on doctrinal reasoning? We
should not, if some alternative can be developed.
In sum, we are left with a two-fold challenge: First, we cannot
adopt a thoughtfully aggressive judicial, or "legal," approach to promoting sound regulatory choices without overthrowing the separation of
powers framework-a framework that is conceptually flawed and unsuccessful on its own terms. This suggests an agenda for legal theory to
devise an alternative basis for legal decisionmaking and legitimacy under
law.
Second, we can understand the broader possibility of improving regulatory performance only with an analytical framework that addresses
the governance crisis. In particular, we must construct a normative, substantive program of where government must go to perform better-mar100. C. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 231.
101. Thomas Sargentich contends that my analysis of the separation of powers-based trichotomy
is nothing more than a guise for the analysis of alternative bases for legitimacy of government action,
as he has elaborated. See Sargentich, The Future of AdministrativeLaw (Book Review), 104 HARV.
L. REv. 769 (1991) (reviewing C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990)); Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process:
The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 385. I disagree as to which is logically prior, and as
to which form for the analysis has more power to explain the perplexities of doctrine and to generate
proposals for both incremental and radical reform.
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ket efficiency or redistributive values are good (although vague)
examples. But we must also provide an account of why particular substantive ideas for better government performance are so often relegated
to library shelves rather than action.
Moreover, to judge the value of new legal theories we should have in
mind an image of governance. Otherwise, we can expect that prescriptions are just as likely to be ineffective. Because legal theory is instrumental, our purposes must be stated and debated. It makes sense,
therefore, to begin with the larger question of governance.
B.

The Governance Problem and the Project of Administrative Law

The claim that we face grave problems in governance reflects an
inchoate critique of either the ambitions or the effectiveness of Reaganism: Reaganism does not solve the problems facing us today or tomorrow. Thus, a different ideology is needed. Indeed, just as the
developing judicial posture towards the regulatory state is shaped by the
ideological milieu from which the judges are drawn and in which they
operate, so too will the future shape of public law be derived from
broader political culture. However, there is nothing deterministic in this.
Judging from history, there may not be a successful new conception of
the project of governance for years to come. Nor is its shape historically
preordained; it must somehow be created as an inspired response to existing problems and constraints.
In this Article I have suggested that the diagnosis or explanation of
our difficulties may be framed at almost any level of abstraction, depending on taste and purpose.10 2 I submit that the starting point must be a
normative socioeconomic critique with some sharp edges set against Reaganism. For example:
1. A New Progressivism. Just as the Progressive Era was a m6lange of reformist impulses (although including some unattractive social
attitudes) with uneven coherence, we may expect little more from an oppositionist post-Reaganism. Although a detailed presentation is inappropriate here, suffice it to say that my own sense of this would be an
amalgam of many themes: growth and investment stimulated through
regulation; equality (not mere promises of opportunity); education and
children; environmentalism; activist government; and effectiveness and
accountability of large organizations, public and private. Consider, also,
the following criticisms of a more specifically institutional character,
each of which is an important part of a comprehensive (if mid-level) ac102. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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count of the governance crisis, and each of which implicates the project
of administrative law.
2. Market Mythology. The resurgent potency of laissez-faire
thinking has a grip on policy debates, obscuring the evils that unregulated behavior can produce. Indeed, market outcomes are often quite
different from those promised by microeconomic models. Market "failure" is more the rule than the exception, yet the seductive elegance of the
model gives it an unyielding grip on policy debate. Relatedly, the myth
of private sector managerial competence flies in the face of the evidence
revealed each morning in the Wall Street Journal.10 3 That economic incentives are relevant seems undeniable. Nevertheless, the proposition
that the invisible guiding hand of economic incentives can effectively address our economic and social challenges can only be dismissed as myth.
The myth, however, has been a useful and powerful element of
Reaganism. 1o4
3. Agency Inaction. Inaction by administrative agencies is a major contributor to the enormous cost of unaddressed policy challenges.
Administrative law can serve by inventing doctrinal devices to make
agency resource allocation choices, in both policy development and enforcement choices, more subject to public illumination debate. Extreme
deference to administrative decisions, suggested by the Supreme Court's
analysis in Heckler v. Chaney,10 5 is unhelpful, because it fails to balance
the values of agency autonomy with those of agency accountability. This
is unacceptable in an era where Congressional oversight is inevitably diminished by the press of legislative business and the institutional disabilities of that branch.
4. Legislative Lethargy and Pseudo-Rationality. Divided partisan
governance, in combination with the sclerotic, lethargic legislative process, raises the transaction costs of both legislative action on controversial matters and of legislative correction of executive or judicial missteps.
103. See, e.g., Truell, Clifford Resigns Bank Post, A Casualty ofBCCI Scandal Wall St. J., Aug.
14, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
104. A very senior official in the Polish government observed in a recent conversation that "radical" disciples of "Milton Friedman" (he picked the name, and not with admiration) have achieved
virtual hegemony over the framework of political economy in his country. When I pressed him for
an intellectual or sociological explanation for this, he offered two points, something like the following: First, there is intense post-revolutionary opposition to any ideology that seems remotely related
to the old discredited regime; second, no competing ideology offers the purity and logical tightness of
neoclassical microeconomics. Like a powerful theology, its coherence provides comfort in chaotic
times; compromises of that coherence are treated as heretical.
105. 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
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One cannot assume that administrators and legislators of different parties
and ideologies will embrace such notions of bilateral comity as bureaucratic fidelity to statutory intent, or respect by legislators for the advantages of flexible managerial authority. On important matters,
administrators and their legislative overseers seem to be antagonists. Administrative law doctrine, therefore, goes astray when it assumes (or pretends) that judicial deference is equivalent to political neutrality. In view
of the congressional disabilities, broad deference to the agency amounts
to alliance by the judiciary with the executive, which disservices the system of checks and balances; it abdicates any direct judicial responsibility
for the quality of governmental actions. On the other hand, policy judgments made by Congress are highly variable in a pure "expertise" sense,
being the product not only of expert advice but also of politics and institutional processes that have a distinctive (ir)rationality. Theories of interpretation will fail if they attempt to reconstruct a design crafted by
some composite rational individual decisionmaker who had a unitary intention or command in mind. Such constructs are usually fantasy, however helpful those interpretive theories may be at making up some useful
guidance in the case at hand. Honoring the legislative role, and strengthening it, requires careful appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of
that institution. More ambitiously, the institution must be reformed to
address those weaknesses; judicial or executive pressures can play a key
role in promoting such reform.
5. Mythical Agency Expertise. The quality of policy judgments
made by agencies is highly variable, so that great deference to agency
expertise, and to procedural insulation of the agency's decisionmaking
against public participation, will in practice mean broad acceptance by
the judiciary of preventable misfeasance. It is difficult to count this as a
valuable goal of administrative law.
6. Public Ignorance and DepressedParticipation. The quality of
public debate and understanding of most issues is exceedingly low. This
undermines the effectiveness of democratic processes because voter
choices are less and less informed, even as government becomes more
and more critical to our collective and personal welfare. Thus, there is a
real need to create a potent ethic of participation-a hundred million
points of light, some of them a hopeful glow, some of them an angry
burning.106
106. The allusion is to President George Bush's call for a spirit of voluntarism ("a thousand
points of light") to address pressing social needs. See Transcript of Bush Speech Accepting Presidential Nomination, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1988, at A14, col. 1. The danger with this call is that within
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These and other points establish a motivation for theory and a measure for invention. The specific piece of theory I want to propose is a
reimagination of the project of administrative law to focus on sound governance, rather than on the control of administrative discretion.
C.

The Sound Governance Projectfor Doctrine and JudicialReview

Administrative law can be part of the developing critique and renovation of governance, but only if it abandons its implicit antidiscretion
project. That project embodies tension between two elements. One is the
affirmative goal of strengthening the administrative state by, for example,
promoting the integration of expertise into bureaucratic action. The
other is the imitation of separation of powers formalism, with the trichotomy of decisionmaking paradigms as a sort of second-best structural
strategy to protect us against arbitrary discretion and official ambition.
Instead, imagine that the core of administrative law can be committed to an ongoing exchange with the political branches about norms of
sound governance. I imagine a process of subconstitutional, common
law elaboration of substantive and procedural matters ranging from costbenefit methodology, to the paper hearing requirements in informal
rulemaking, to presumptions about the direction of congressional policies
trenching on such fundamental social concerns as federalism and income
redistribution.
The new administrative law would have no place for such cases as
Chevron, 107 Vermont Yankee, 108 or last term's decision in PensionBenefit
Guarantee Corp. v. LTV Corp. 109 Instead, we would find inspiration in
cases that, with their activist pursuit of better public administration, invite a dialogue with the agencies and Congress over the norms of sound
governance. That activism need not take the form of ham-handed impositions binding in all circumstances for all time. Rather, courts can establish guidelines, presumptions, requirements of explanation, and
impositions temporarily stayed to provide time for agency or legislative
counter-proposal. Courts have shown an admirable ability to combine
appropriate deference or comity with strong activism and authority in
settings as diverse as public interest institutional reform litigation, equitable remedies in antitrust cases, and corporate bankruptcies. ImplementaReaganism, voluntarism is posed as an anti-statist alternative to collective action through government programs. Still, there is a truth to the diagnosis of anemic civic participation. .
107. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
109. 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990) (applying Vermont Yankee to limit judicial efforts to proceduralize
informal adjudication).
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tion of an environmental or securities statute is no greater challenge for
judicial invention, once one decides to move away from the conceptual
failings of reasoning based on unsustainable distinctions between politics,
science, and adjudicatory fairness.
The problem is more than an anachronistic concern with arbitrary
discretion. That old project is not even appropriate as an indirect means
to pursue sound governance. Constraining discretion may be counterproductive, especially given our complex and inexorable ambitions for
public enterprise. A realistic appraisal of the problems we face as a society and the undeniable institutional limitations of Congress suggests that
we cannot indulge a dream that Congress must make all fundamental
policy judgments and that the role of bureaucrats should be confined as
nearly as possible to ministerial implementation. 110 Then, too, if we
chase discretion as an indirect means of pursuing sound governance, we
make both our ends and means obscure, which in turn makes both popular and professional critique more difficult. Finally, as I argued earlier,
chasing discretion has failed on its own terms-like a dog chasing its tail.
Would the separation of powers-based trichotomy of decisionmaking paradigms be irrelevant to sound governance review? I think not,
because these paradigms capture some "truth" about the way we think,
and all must be present and well-executed in sound decisionmaking.
Like senses of perception, they must be balanced and integrated, not artificially divided for purposes of institutional role or decisionmaking. We
use a full range of sounds and colors to perceive accurately our surroundings. An observer deaf to high notes or blind to red hues can "hear" a
Beethoven string quartet and "see" fall foliage in Vermont. The resulting reports might be unreliable for some purposes: "Don't buy that record"; or "Visit in August, when it's easier to get a motel room."
Several things follow from this. It is certainly misleading and
counterproductive to characterize any but the most trivial questions
presented to an agency as involving solely one paradigm. If agency officials treat an OSHA rulemaking as a political matter, they are wrong; if
courts treat the resulting controversy as a policy matter, they are wrong;
and if pro-labor advocates treat it as a question of law, they too are
wrong. Similarly, it is a conceptual error to scale the intensity of judicial
review based directly, or implicitly, on some characterization of the decisionmaking paradigm actually employed by the agency. For example,
when the Court in the State Farm airbags deregulation case treated the
rescission of the passive restraints regulation as the product of rational
110. Richard Stewart used a transmission belt metaphor. See Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1675 (1975) (traditional model of administrative law views agency as mere transmission belt for implementing legislative directives).

Vol. 1991:561]

THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS

policy analysis, and used a species of hard-look review to evaluate the
action on that basis, it artificially ignored (at least in its rhetoric) the
other paradigms at work. 1 ' This is akin to looking at only the green
hues in a Vermont October, or appraising a marinara sauce solely on the
freshness of the tomatoes.
If judicial analysis and rhetoric directly engaged the mix and quality
of all three paradigms, and sought to evolve a normative framework for
sound agency governance, the obscurity and indirection of administrative
law would be replaced by a forthright dialogue over how to make the
public enterprise more successful. Courts would be drawn into that challenge, with all the attendant risks and potential benefits.
A corollary of this role is that the difficult distinction between procedure and substance would be far less relevant. Thus, for example,
when the Court in Vermont Yankee sought to limit judicial imposition of
extra-statutory procedural obligations in informal rulemaking, 112 judges
who were so inclined could respond by increasing their demands for "adequate" reasons and findings, or by exacting a stronger demonstration of
policy justification through substantive hard-look review," 3 all under the
"arbitrary and capricious" rubric. In my view, lower courts now have
effective ability to pursue sound governance only by virtue of the manipulability of such leading cases as Vermont Yankee, 1 4 Chevron, 115 and
6
Mathews v. Eldridge."
Over time, judges in dialogue with the other branches and with advocates can evolve helpful strategies for sound governance on procedural,
quasi-procedural, and substantive dimensions. When judges misstep in
this enterprise, the direct revelation of judicial reasoning will invite correction by Congress or by the agency itself. For example, Congress or
the relevant agency could expressly mandate regulations concerning the
form of cost-benefit analysis to be employed, the mechanism for consulting outside experts, the arrangements to invite negotiations with a politically diverse set of affected interests, or the principles to guide the
allocation of enforcement resources.
Does this invite judicial willfulness? The current project of administrative law already affords ample room for this. Sound governance review would structure the judge's application of personal, practical
11. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
112. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524-25.
113. See International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 812-28
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
114. Vermont Yankee Nueler Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
115. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
116. 424 U.S. 219 (1976).
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wisdom and preferences. The devices of revelation and fluidity will permit public scrutiny, reversals, and the evolution of norms. Rather than
shrouding judicial discretion in indirection and doctrinal manipulation,
new courts and new judges would undertake this project with a self-conscious sense of their potential contribution to a collective effort to improve governance. The blind deference of judges unwilling to take a
stand on the soundness of agency action, trapped by separation of powers
formalism, would give way to a far more contingent judicial posture, legitimated not by formalism or narrow professionalism, but by other devices and values.
Without the trichotomy and separation of powers precepts, what
would provide judicial legitimacy? The first source would be judicial effectiveness in directly promoting the pursuit of sound governance.
Courts and jurists would assume the risk of being popularly judged for
their actions through the responses of the coordinate branches. The second source would be the multiplicity of forums. Rather than asserting
the methodological distinctiveness of law and the judicial branch (an argument rooted in the discredited trichotomy), one would stress the value
of sustaining the courts as an alternative forum in which to appeal the
alleged missteps of the other two branches. The judiciary's claim of legitimacy would be strengthened, in turn, by framing the judicial role in
terms of dialogue: Its holdings and remedies would be flexible and subconstitutional so as to permit, indeed invite, evolutionary response by the
agency and the legislature.
A third source of legitimacy is the institutional and personal competence of the judiciary. For this, it is clear, one requires some institutional
invention. It seems an unlikely strategy to rely on article III courts that
are staffed with lawyers steeped in separation of powers concerns. Other
familiar models deserve exploration: the old idea of specialized article I
or article III courts;117 a quasi-independent administrative agency exercising some of the regulatory review functions currently served by the
Office of Management and Budget; 118 the French Conseil d'&at;" 19 and
the use of masters and ancillary procedures by courts supervising complex equitable remedies or bankruptcies.120 I favor a combination of reformed and new courts, but the best prescription undoubtedly depends
on countless matters of ideological and political context.
117. See Silberman, Masters and MagistratesPart . The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1297, 1307-09 (1975).
118. See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Aiz. L. REV. 1267
(1981).
119. See Note, The French Conseil d'Etat-An Essay on Administrative Jurisprudence,24 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1972).

120. I explore these options in C. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 236-59.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

What I have proposed may be wrong, and I was earlier inclined to
characterize these thoughts as utopian or speculative to deflect criticism
about practicality. 12 1 Having now explored the connections among the
realms of political ideology, theory, and practical invention, I feel somewhat bolder. My earlier discussion suggests two important points.
First, the ultimate feasibility of any proposed invention will turn on
the power of the political ideology that informs it. Just as the inventions
of modern administrative law resonated with judges and others because
of the context provided by the New Deal political critique and affirmative
program, and just as the hegemony of Reaganism makes us unsurprised
by Chevron, 122 there is every reason to believe that a successful postReagan critique of governance might complement a bolder form of administrative law.
Second, success in the realm of political critique and ideology will
not only serve to refine the content of doctrinal prescriptions, but will
make those prescriptions politically acceptable. Put differently, the calculation of whether a given invention is utopian or practical involves
identification of political interests and obstacles, which are in turn con123
tingent on the matrix of reigning and insurgent political ideologies.
Some historians argue that every few decades the relatively stable
two-party political system is thrown into confusion and realignment,
with the content of party ideology shifting even if the party names remain the same. Thus, we had the alignment of the Founders and AntiFederalists until that was displaced by the Jacksonian-Whig framework.
This gave way to the Republican-Democrat structure of the Civil War
period, followed by the 1890s realignment; the 1932 to 1936 New Deal
period was clearly transformative. As this is written, President Bush's
popularity in the polls is hovering near 122%, and it seems obvious to
mention that a realignment is in the works. The financial and media
advantages of congressional incumbency make this realignment slower
than earlier ones, perhaps. In any case, what remains for us to see is
what cogent, counterbalancing political ideology to Reaganism will
emerge as the new alignment becomes stable.
I have tried to suggest a few themes that might be represented in
allied developments in the realms of political ideology, theory, and prac121. Id. at 213.
122. Through judicial abdication, Chevron empowers agencies to give a pinched implementation
of congressional policies. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-46 (1984).
123. I am indebted to Roberto Unger for showing me that there is an identity between substantive invention and the calculation of political interests-that they are two sides of the same coin.
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tical invention. In casting about for some alternative to rewarming the
New Deal critiques of laissez-faire economics and philosophical formalism, I have urged some attention to postmodernist sensibilities, tempered
with an empirically-rooted pragmatism. In this, I self-consciously borrow from the Legal Realists. I take my inspiration from Aristotle's insistence that political philosophy is different from logic; 124 it must be both
empirical and abstract, both practical and scientific.
Most important, my theme is that those of us in the academy, on the
bench, at the bar, and in the corridors of government who are dissatisfied
with the evolutionary direction of administrative law must recognize that
doctrinal change is part of a larger ideological and theoretical whole. To
do more than wage a guerrilla war in dissenting opinions and law reviews, those who would urge a redirection of doctrine must make intellectual alliance with those who are struggling to create a coherent loyal
opposition in the realms of ideology and theory. Such alliances, history
teaches, offer the best hope of harnessing invention to good and lasting
effect.
Finally, I must return to the governance theme. The fundamental
reason to hope for some modification of or alternative to the reigning
ideology is that it offers no solution to the crisis in American governance.
Without answers to the institutional and social problems we face, the
nation is being diminished, and the lowest among us dream less and less
of relief from grinding hardship. I believe that administrative law at its
best must be concerned with such failures of governance, and with the
direct promotion of something better.

124. See ARISTOTLE, POLITIcS 3, 28, 256 (C. Lord trans. 1984).

